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MARTIN CARRIER'
Abstract Orte of the challenges Kuhn's work poses to philosophy of science con-
cems the insight that theory-choice and, accordingly, theory-change is governed by
a more complex and subtle procedure than anticipated. In particular, this procedure
is claimed to inevitably and justifiedly leave room for individual preferences so that
theory-choice fails to be determined unambiguously by criteria with epistemic bearing.
This methodological uncertainty can be labeled as Kuhn-underdetermination. Unlike
Duhem-Quine underdetermination, it does not require empirical equivalence but rather
refers to a situation in which alternative theories have their strengths and faults in
different areas and in different respects so that no clear overall picture emerges. Over-
arching methodological theories can be construed as attempts to overcome the limits
set by Kuhn underdetermination. In this perspective, theories like Lakatosianism and
Bayesianism provide mies for epistemic judgments that are intended to make a clear
evaluation of the credentials of rivaling scientific theories possible. The two meth-
odological theories are supposed to serve as guidelines for methodological judgment
or at least to explain with hindsight why a particular theory was picked. However, an
closer scrutiny the two methodological theories founder in this tack of accounting for
theory choice decisions. The criteria of excellence they specify are kable to uncertainties of
the saure sort as the more traditional virtues they are intended to replace. The paper
proposes an alternative picture: methodological theories suggest general maxims and
mies that guide the confirmation process rather than provide criteria for specific theory-
choice decisions. Methodological theories serve to connect and unify such maxims
and rules. Traditionally, lists of methodological virtues are drawn up ad hoc. One
could easily add further criteria or delete others. By contrast, methodological theories
provide a coherent approach to appreciating scientific theories and comparing their
explanatory achievements. And they give a rationale for why these rules rather than
others deserve to be preferred.
Keywords Bayesian confirmation, cognitive virtues of theories, Copernican revolu-
tion, Kuhn, Kuhn-underdetermination, Lakatos, methodological incommensurability,
methodology of scientific research programs.
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1. THE CHALLENGE OF KUHN-UNDERDETERMINATION
TO METHODOLOGY
In his celebrated book an The Aiin and Structure of Physical Theory (1906) Pierre
Duhem developed the important methodological insight that logic and experience alone
are insufficient for assessing the cognitive credentials or the epistemic credibility of a
hypothesis. Additional criteria are needed which, consequently, can only be non-empirical
in kind (Duhem, 1906, Chap. X.2, X.8, X.10). This Duhemian insight constitutes the
basis for one of Thomas Kuhn's most influential arguments. This argument is con-
cerned with the nature and significance of the non-empirical criteria that are brought to
bear an appraising the trustworthiness of hypotheses or theories. Kuhn argues that the
procedure for assessing theories inevitably and justifiably leaves room for individual
preferences. Criteria with epistemic bearing that are neutral as to the Substantive com-
mitments involved are insufficient for determining theory-choice unambiguously.
The argument roughly proceeds as follows. In Kuhn's methodological framework,
the need to compare the merits of alternative theories chiefly arises during periods of
crisis. In such periods, an established paradigm is undermined by an accumulation of
failures in puzzle-solving, and a contender (or more than one) is advanced with the
intention to supplant the received view. Under such conditions, the exclusive consid-
eration of the empirical record does not furnish an adequate yardstick for measuring
comparative success unequivocally. On the one hand, the aging paradigm Buffers from
a large number of anomalies; otherwise, no crisis would have emerged in the first
place. The fresh rival approach was conceived only recently and pursued for a short
time. For this reason it is bound to exhibit lacunae and open issues which need to be
taken into account when the relative merits are to be assessed. As a result, both com-
peting approaches are liable to exhibit empirical deficiencies. Ort the other hand, both
approaches are also supported by some successful explanations; otherwise they would
have exited from the scene earlier and never been featured as theories confronting one
another in a crisis. Thus, the empirical situation must be intricate and opaque and can-
not allow a clear and unambiguous ranking. It follows from the principles of Kuhn's
methodological theory that logic and experience are insufficient as a basis for theory-
choice. Duhem's claim becomes a theorem of Kuhn's approach.
As in Duhem, the consequence is that non-empirical virtues need to be invoked in
addition. As Kuhn points out, there is a whole array of uncontroversial, prima-facie
suitable standards which look impartial and are not wedded to one of the competitors.
Kuhn's list of values for appraising theories, sometimes designated as "The Big Five,"
include accuracy, consistency, broad scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness (Kuhn, 1977,
pp. 321-322). Such virtues are transparadigmatic in kind and thus avoid the charge of
circularity that emerges naturally when, for instance, the commitment to push-and-
shove causation is suggested as the arbiter between Cartesian vortices and Newtonian
gravitational forces, or when the methodologically dubious character of mental states
is advanced as a standard for deciding between behaviorism and cognitive psychology.
Transparadigmatic virtues of the sort Kuhn describes are more ecumenical than such
biased standards that are heavily intertwined with the Substantive commitments of one
of the contenders.
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In addition, such virtues feature cognitive or explanatory achievements rather than
social interests or aesthetic predilections. They can be linked up with epistemic aspi-
rations or assumed goals of science (Carrier, 1986, p. 205; Hoyningen-Huene, 1992,
pp. 498-499). After all, a theory that takes account of a wide realm of phenomena in
a precise fashion and coheres well with other accepted beliefs yields what we demand
of scientific knowledge. Such accomplishments represent what we take scientific
progress to be all about. Although non-empirical in kind, such criteria arguably have
an epistemic bearing.2
By contrast, social values or criteria of judgment are based an the appreciation
of certain social or political structures. The "strong programme in the sociology of
science," as inaugurated by David Bloor (1976), regards social interests as the pivot
of theory evaluation. The most widely received example is the controversy between
Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes in the 1660s about the legitimacy and bearing of
experimentally gained knowledge in contrast to deductive theoretical systems. The
production of experimental knowledge relied an and favored a community of "free
men, freely acting, faithfully delivering what they witnessed and sincerely believed
to be the case" (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985, p. 339). In contradistinction, a deductive
system was based an principles laid down by philosophical masters and thus gener-
ated and sustained in an absolutist manner (ibid.). The claim advocated by Shapin and
Schaffer is that the predominant political orientation of the period and experimental
science had a common form of life. They were republican in spirit, not monarchist,
and this shared social factor was the reason why Boylean experimentalism triumphed
over Hobbesian deductivism (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985, p. 342). The contention is
that the social or political struggle drives science in a particular direction; epistemic
virtues do not play a significant role.
Further, the importance of aesthetic values for theory choice is advocated by the
early Kuhn, the author of The Copernican Revolution. Kuhn claimed in this context
that Copernican astronomy superseded the geocentric account because it exhibited
"geometric harmony"; the initial choice between the two was a matter of taste. The
Copemican arguments exclusively appealed to the aesthetic sense of the astronomers
(Kuhn, 1957, pp. 171, 180). The later Kuhn was more favorable to the import of cog-
nitive criteria. "Simplicity," to be sure, depending an how it is understood, could pass
as a purely pragmatic asset that makes a theory easy to work with. Yet the remain-
der of Kuhn's list can be seen as indicating epistemic achievements of the theories
involved.
However, given this commitment to non-empirical, cognitive virtues, Kuhn
expounds two restrictions to unambiguous theory choice. The obvious impediment is
that different cognitive criteria could be brought to bear. For instance, Willard V. O.
Quine and Joseph Ullian feature, among other criteria, "conservatism" (i.e., coherence
with the background knowledge), generality (i.e., broad scope), and "refutability"
(i.e., empirical testability) (Quine and Ullian, 1978, pp. 66-80). Peter Kosso gives a
different, but related cluster of cognitive criteria of evaluation which includes, among
Kosso (1992, pp. 28, 35-4 1). Compare Worrall (2000 ) for contrasting views an the status of such criteria.
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others, "entrenchment" (i.e., coherence with the background knowledge), precision,
and generality (Kosso, 1992, pp. 35-41). It goes without saying that different lists
might induce different preferences in theory choice situations.
Kuhn's more subtle point is that even the agreement an a collection of criteria of
this sort is insufficient for singling out one of the rival approaches for acceptance. The
reasons are that these criteria tend to conflict with one another when applied to par-
ticular cases and that they are too imprecise to guide theory choice unambiguously. In
order to appraise the relative merits of particular rival theories, such criteria need tobe
weighted and rendered more precise. And there is no clear rule or algorithm for achiev-
ing this task. As a result, one of the competing theories may appear superior according
to some such standards and inferior according to others. It follows that transparadig-
matic, epistemically relevant criteria fail to make theory choice unambiguous. There
is always room left for subjective elements. This uncertainty of judgment is labeled
as Kuhn-underdetermination or methodological incommensurability. The contention
is that, typically, the relative merits of rival accounts do not provide a basis for unam-
biguously rating one of them over the other (Kuhn, 1977, pp. 322, 324-325).
Kuhn cites the competition between Ptolemaic astronomy and Copernican helio-
centrism around 1550 as a case in point. As he argues, both accounts roughly coincide
with respect to accuracy and scope. But geocentric astronomy outperforms its rival
as regards consistency. Consistency does not alone refer to the internal structure of
a theory but extends to its coherence with other views accepted in the science of the
period. The notion that the earth remains at rest at the center of the universe matches
Aristotelian physics excellently. According to this approach, heavy bodies fall down
to the earth because they strive toward their natural place which is at the center of the
universe. This Aristotelian account of the origin and nature of the weight of heavy
bodies cannot be squared easily with the assumption that the earth is revolving around
the center of the universe (see Sect. 2). Copernican theory suffers from its incompat-
ibility with the physics of the time. By contrast, Kuhn goes an to argue, Copernican
theory Scores better regarding simplicity. At least unless simplicity is understood in
terms of the computational effort it takes to arrive at some tangible result. In computa-
tional respect, namely, the simplicity of the Ptolemaic and Copernican approaches was
about at the same level. Yet the latter is simpler in the sense of providing a less cum-
bersome account of the gross qualitative features of planetary motion (Kuhn, 1977,
pp. 322-324).
What was actually at stake here was explanatory power. Theories with great explan-
atory power need a minimum of independent principles to account for a broad dass of
phenomena in an accurate fashion. Copemican astronomy excelled in this respect as
regards the qualitative features of planetary motion. For instance, heliocentric theory
attributes the retrograde motion of the planets, as it occurs periodically, to their order
with respect to the sun and their periods of revolution. Retrogression is observed when
the earth overtakes a superior planet er is overtaken by an inferior one. The core prin-
ciples of Copernican theory are suitable for explaining the entirety of the relevant
properties of the phenomenon, among them correlations of the sort that retrograde
motion of the superior planets only occurs when these planets stand in Opposition to
the sun and reach their maximum brightness. In a heliocentric setting, one realizes
immediately that the earth can overtake a superior planet only if the sun is located in
opposition to the planet, as seen from the earth, and that the earth comes particularly
dose to the planet under such circumstances. Ptolemaic astronomy was also able to
cope with these correlations, to be sure, but it had to resort to an extra hypothesis
for each such account. In contrast to the Copernican scheme, Ptolemy needed addi-
tional, tailor-made assumptions for every single aspect of the phenomenon. In view
of achievements of this sort, Copernican astronomy clearly stands out in explanatory
power (Carrier, 2001, pp. 8 1-92).
Anyway, the picture presented by Kuhn takes Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy
to be roughly an a par as regards accuracy, and which one of the two (if any) counts
as being more simple depends an how "simplicity" is understood or rendered precise.
Further, heliocentrism lags behind as to consistency, i.e., its coherence with other parts
of accepted scientific theory, but displays a paramount power of explaining astronomi-
cal phenomena. There are no geocentric anomalies resolved, but the qualitative helio-
centric explanations are more stringent and do not turn an ad-hoc adaptations. Judged
in terms of these cognitive values, the comparative assessment leads to a draw.
The example of the Copernican Revolution is atypical in that the rival accounts
entailed approximately the same observational consequences (at least with respect to
astronomical phenomena). Yet unlike Duhem-Quine underdetermination, Kuhn-
underdetermination does not require empirical equivalence but rather refers to a
situation in which alternative theories display their strengths and weaknesses in
different fields and in different respects so that no clear overall comparative assessment
of the epistemic accomplishments is feasible. This comes out more distinctly in Kuhn's
second example, namely, the Chemical Revolution (Kuhn, 1977, p. 323). The phlogiston
theory had a hard time accommodating the weight increase during combustion and
calcination whereas the Oxygen theory was at a loss to account for the fact that the prop-
erties of the supposedly elementary metals resembled one another much more closely
than the properties of the corresponding oxides - in spite of the fact that the latter were
assumed to contain oxygen as a common ingredient. By contrast, this trait appeared
quite plausible an the phlogistic principle that metals derived their chief properties from
phlogiston as their common constituent.
Accordingly, both contenders were faced with anomalies - albeit of a different
sort. Yet the impact of these anomalies was far from obvious and depended an how
the commitment to empirical adequacy, shared by the competitors, was spelled out.
The chief aspiration of the phlogiston theory, and the yardstick used for measuring
its achievement, was to explain, in a qualitative fashion, the properties of the chemical
substances involved and their changes during chemical reactions. In this respect,
phlogiston theory outstripped its rival - as the example suggests. Oxygen theory, by
contrast, placed quantitative weight relations at the focus and in this respect greatly
exceeded the performance of the traditional view. As a result, taking variations of
empirical adequacy into account does not change the conclusion suggested by the
Copernican Revolution. The notion of empirical adequacy may be understood differ-
ently, just as the non-empirical virtues addressed before, and is in need of adjustment if
it is to provide an unambiguous balanced appraisal of the empirical accomplishments
of the theories involved.
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The upshot is that methodological judgment is rendered ambiguous by the room
left for selecting and balancing different criteria of evaluation. The adoption of differ-
ent Standards may issue in divergent preferences, and even a shared canon of criteria or
values for choosing between competing theories fails to provide a clear measure of epis-
temic achievement. How such theories are to be rated depends an how the relevant val-
ues are rendered precise and how they are weighted, i.e., which one is given precedence
in case of conflict (Laudan, 1984, p. 83; Kosso, 1992, pp. 46-47; Nola and Sankey,
2000, p. 28). No unambiguous comparative evaluation emerges from bringing Kuhn's
"Big Five" to bear. Duhem's claim is sharpened to the effect that logic, experience and
the commitment to cognitive values arejointly insufficient to establish a clear rank-order
among rival theories. The methodological judgment is Kuhn-underdetermined.
It needs to be underlined that Kuhn himself takes the room for theory choice opened
up by Kuhn-underdetermination as an asset rather than a liability. The reason is that the
prospects of success for rival accounts are typically objectively indeterminate. Nobody
is in a position to reliably anticipate which one will prevail in the end. A procedure of
judgment that yields unambiguous scores at the early stages of theory articulation is
liable to mislead the scientific community into pursuing only one option - the allegedly
superior one. If it turns out later that the choice was mistaken, no theoretical resources
are left for correcting the error. In a situation govemed by uncertainty, the optimum
strategy is spreading the risk so that different parts of the community explore different
theoretical tacks. This is achieved naturally if the competitors score differently in dif-
ferent respects. Given the usual variation in individual preferences, Kuhn underdeter-
mination can be expected to produce the desired division of the community. Individual
uncertainty leads to the collective epistemic optimum (Kuhn, 1970b, p. 248, 1977, pp.
325-334; Hoyningen-Huene, 1992, pp. 493-494; Carrier, 2002, p. 58).
Kuhre suggested that theory choice and, consequently, theory change was governed
by a more complex and subtle procedure than anticipated by earlier methodological
accounts. The underdetermination of judgment creates room for science to cope appro-
priately with epistemic risk and uncertainty. By contrast, others considered Kuhn-
underdetermination a major threat to scientific rationality. Imre Lakatos claimed that
only universal epistemic standards of judgment are compatible with the requirements
of sound methodology. Any room left to personal predilections involves a surrender of
science to authority. The judgment of the scientific community would be shaped by
the opinion leaders and theory change would become a matter of "mob psychology"
(Lakatos, 1970, pp. 90-91, 1973, pp. 324-325). In other words, Kuhn-underdetermination
is regarded as the first step toward relativism and the collapse of scientific rationality.
In view of the contentious import of Kuhn-underdetermination, it appears worthwhile
to examine options for blocking its emergence.
2. METHODOLOGICAL THEORIES AND HISTORICAL THEORY CHANGE
Kuhn's argument proceeds from a collection of diverse cognitive values. Their lack of
precision and the possible conflict among them is the reason why Kuhn-underdetermination
or methodological incommensurability can arise in the ferst place. Consequently,
its emergence could be blocked by introducing criteria of judgment that are sufficiently
precise and of such a sort that no discordant assessments are entailed by them. Overarching
methodological theories can be construed as attempts to provide such an advanced
basis for the evaluation of scientific achievements and thus to overcome the limits
set by Kuhn-underdetermination. In the following, 1 turn to Lakatos' methodology of
scientific research programs and to Bayesian confirmation theory as examples of such
attempts. Lakatosianism and Bayesianism can be interpreted as endeavors to make a
rule-governed, epistemically based, and unambiguous assessment of the merits of rival
scientific theories possible and thus to neutralize the impact of Kuhn-underdetermination.
Let me explore how well the two methodologies fare in this respect.
Lakatos' unit of methodological appraisal is the research program or, more precisely,
the series of theories that make up such a program. A research program is characterized
by a "hard core" of principles which are retained by its advocates at all cost. Problems are
taken care of by adapting the "protective belt" of auxiliary hypotheses which is taken
to consist of observation theories, suppositions of initial and boundary conditions, and
additional assumptions within the corresponding theory itself In conceptual respect,
Lakatos demands that the program development be directed by a "positive heuristic," i.e.,
a set of comprehensive theoretical guidelines for its future development. The positive
heuristic singles out significant theoretical Problems and offers tools for their solution.
It directs scientists through the maze of confttsing difficulties by providing a plan how
to elaborate the program. One of Lakatos' historical assertions is that the development of
a distinguished, high-quality program is determined by its positive heuristic and does
not merely respond to conceptual and empirical difficulties. Methodological standards
are supposed to direct the transition from a program version to its successor or the
replacement of a program by a competitor. 1 focus an the most important standards as
specified by Lakatos. An acceptable successor version within a program is required,
firnt, to remain in agreement with the positive heuristic of the program, second, to
account for all those phenomena that are successfully explained by its predecessor
- albeit, possibly, in a different fashion, and, third, to successfully predict some novel,
hitherto unexpected facts. Lakatos demands the reproduction of the previous empirical
achievements and the anticipation of observational regularities that were unknown to
science before. Rival research programs are to be evaluated analogously. Programs
that satisfy these program-internal standards are compared by applying the conditions
of reproduction and anticipation to the competitors. A superior program has to reproduce the
explanatory successes of the rival program and predict effects unexpected within
the framework of the latter (Lakatos, 1970, pp. 33-36, 47-52, 68-69; Carrier, 2002,
pp. 59-63).
Kuhn grounds the comparative evaluation of theories an a collection of alternative
criteria - which is why conflicts among them can arise. By contrast, Lakatos requires
the joint satisfaction of a number of demands. No conflict between the reproduction
of explanatory content and the anticipation of novel regularities can possibly surface
because both conditions need to be met. The Kuhnian process of weighting alternative
standards is avoided altogether. Assuming that Lakatos' requirements are sufficiently
precise, Kuhn-underdetermination cannot become manifest (see Carrier, 2002,
pp. 63-64).
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Consider the Copernican program at the time of Galileo as an example. The theory
was able to account for the entirety of planetary positions with roughly the Same (or
even slightly increased) accuracy as compared to the Ptolemaic program. In addition,
as Galileo showed, the Copernican theory entailed a stunning new effect, namely, the
phases of Venus. Neither this consequence of the Copemican scheme nor the exist-
ence of the phenomenon had been realized before. According to the Ptolemaic theory,
Venus was assumed to revolve around the earth and at the Same time perform a rotat-
ing or "epicyclic" motion in the course of this revolution. In addition, since Venus
always remains in the vicinity of the sun (after all, it features as the "morning Star" or
the "evening star," respectively), Ptolemaic theory surmised a coupling of its motion
around the earth to the position of the sun. The overall result was that Venus was taken
to rotate before or below the sun. Consequently, the appearance of Venus should oscil-
late between a phase of darkness analogous to new moon and a crescent-shaped phase.
Ort the heliocentric account, by contrast, Venus is supposed to revolve around the sun
and should run, accordingly, through the fall cycle of phases like the moon. All these
consequence relations had escaped the attention of astronomers prior to Galileo, and
the phenomenon itself is unobservable with the naked eye. In 1611, Galileo discovered
the effect using a telescope, he realized that it followed from the Copernican scheme
and presented it as a confirmed prediction and a major epistemic achievement of helio-
centrism. Indeed, in view of Lakatos' criteria of reproduction and successful anticipa-
tion, Copernicanism is rightly considered superior to the Ptolemaic account.'
Lakatos' methodology thus appears to specify fairly unambiguous evaluation
rules for competing accounts. But it does not fall victim to Kuhn's charge that any
evaluation algorithm may lead to rash and inappropriate judgments. The reason is
that Lakatos' approach automatically implies an initial limitation of methodological
evaluation. According to Lakatos, empirical support primarily arises from confirmed
predictions. However a certain period of time has to be granted for ascertaining
whether a theoretical anticipation is borne out empirically. As a consequence, the
performance of a theory cannot be assessed instantly. This delay in judgment Lakatos
calls "the end of instant rationality" (Lakatos, 1970, pp. 68, 87). It entails that Kuhn-
underdetermination may be resolved with hindsight, but continues to restrict actual
theory-choice decisions.' Ort the whole, then, Lakatos' claim is that comparative theory
assessments can be reconstructed as rule-guided and rational without at the Same time
being liable to Kuhn's charge of prematurity. Once in a while it seems possible to
have one's cake and eat it, too.
The Situation is complicated through the fact that the geoheliocentric, "Tychonic" successor version to
the Ptolemaic variant of geocentric astronomy also yielded this confirmed prediction.
In addition , Lakatos wants to separate methodological evaluation from any recommendation to the rel-
evant scientists regarding which program to accept or to pursue. No advice is given to accept or pursue
the superior theory. The reason Lakatos advances for abstaining from any such advice is its fallibility
that is due to the fact that apparently unsuccessful predictions may prove correct after all and that the
success of a program is crucially dependent an the resources and the creativity devoted to its develop-
ment (Lakatos, 1970, pp. 68-70, 1978, p. 217).
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However, an closer scrutiny Kuhn-underdetermination resurges in Lakatos'
methodological framework. Its chief source is the change in the scope of programs
or the division of programs. Consider a comprehensive program that is followed by
a number of narrower successor programs so that the domain of the former is later
covered by several distinct approaches. This situation is not untypical and it tends to
reintroduce the challenge of ambiguous methodological judgments. The shift toward
heliocentrism is a case in point. The pertinent original program is Aristotelian physics
and cosmology. Orte of its principles says that all bodies strive toward their natural
places where they come to rest (see Sect. 1). The natural place of "heavy" bodies (in
contrast to "light" ones such as air and fire) coincides with the Center of the universe.
It follows that the earth is located at this center and that solid or liquid (i.e., heavy)
bodies move an their own in the direction of this center and, consequently, toward
the surface of the earth. Given this framework, the excentric location and the revolu-
tion of the earth should produce effects an terrestrial motions which are not, in fact,
observed. If the sun were at the center of the universe, heavy bodies left to themselves
should move there rather than fall an the surface of the earth. And if the earth were
in motion, bodies thrown perpendicularly into the air should be deviated in westward
direction. After all, the trajectory toward the Center of the earth remains unaffected by
an eventual revolution of the earth so that its surface should proceed eastward while
the body is in flight. No one of these consequences is confirmed empirically and these
anomalies militate against the Copernican allegations.
It follows that if the domain of application of heliocentrism is limited to astro-
nomical issues, its greater explanatory power makes it look superior to the geocentric
alternative (see Sect. 1). But if the whole of physics and cosmology is taken into con-
sideration, the higher degree of coherence of the geocentric approach or, conversely
speaking, the occurrence of anomalies to heliocentrism in terrestrial physics sug-
gests that geocentrism retains the lead. That is, the two theories are ranked differently
according to the scope that is deemed relevant. Kuhn-underdetermination again makes
its appearance.5
This is by no means a singular case. Consider Hendrik Lorentz' classical electron
theory that was superseded in part by special relativity theory and in other respects
later by quantum mechanics. Special relativity is the heir to electron theory as regards the
electrodynamics of moving bodies but has nothing to say an such interactions between
charges and fields that become manifest, for instance, in the normal Zeeman effect
(i.e., the split of spectral lines in a magnetic field). This effect was accounted for in
Lorentz' theory and later incorporated into quantum mechanics. But how are we to
judge the situation around 1910 when quantum mechanics was not yet in the offing?
If we proceed from the entire domain of application of electron theory, we need to
conclude that special relativity failed to fully reproduce the explanatory success of the
earlier account. In view of the fact that special relativity comes out superior within its
domain, the upshot is that no clear rank-order among the two approaches can justifiably
It was first systematically elaborated by Larry Laudan that the domain of application of a theory may
be contentious and that the scope attributed to it may strongly influence its methodological appraisal
(Laudan, 1977, pp. 19-21).
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be specified. If, by contrast, consideration is limited to the domain of special relativity,
electron theory is superseded. Again, the methodological judgment is dependent an
which scope is assigned to the rival programs.
A third example is taken from psychology and concerns the "cognitive revolution"
of the 1960s which involved the replacement of behaviorism with cognitive psychol-
ogy. The development of cognitive psychology brought major advances in the expla-
nation of human behavior - including the successful prediction of novel facts (Carrier
and Mittelstrass, 1991, pp. 132-140; Carrier, 1998, pp. 223-224). On the other hand,
the new program largely failed to extend to animal behavior, so that with respect to
the latter, behaviorism essentially remained in place. It didn't appear overly plausible
to attribute elaborate motivational processes and other intricate mental procedures to
pigeons, rats, er the common fruit fly. With respect to these latter creatures, Skinne-
rian reinforcement mechanisms were retained. As a result, the comparative evaluation
is crucially influenced by what is taken as the relevant domain of application. If the
scope is limited to humans, cognitive psychology clearly supersedes behaviorism; if
the relevant domain is extended to all living creatures, cognitive psychology fails to
reproduce the whole of the behaviorist explanatory content so that no clear judgment
emerges.
Speaking more generally, the scope dependence of judgment reveals an ambigu-
ity er lack of precision in Lakatos' criteria of evaluation that might lead to a shifting
ranking of theories. In particular, the requirement of explanatory reproduction can be
interpreted differently. It can be restricted to narrower domains or extended to broader
ones. As a result, Kuhn-underdetermination proves resistant to facile dissolution.
Problems of Bayesianism likewise emerge primarily with respect to the precision
of methodological criteria - or lack thereof. Bayesianism takes Bayes' theorem of
probability theory as the basis for methodological judgment. Construed along such
lines, Bayes' theorem says that the probability of a hypothesis given the available
evidence, p(h/e), equals the likelihood of the evidence, that is, the expectedness of the
data given the hypothesis, p(e/h), times the prior probability of the hypothesis, i.e., its
probability before the evidence e was actually registered, p(h), over the probability of
the evidence, p(e):
p(h/e)= p(elh) p(h)
p(e)
Bayesianism is committed to using Bayes' theorem as a rule for adapting and updating
beliefs in light of the evidence. This so-called principle of conditionalization directs us
to employ Bayes' formula for assessing assumptions. Hypotheses are the better con-
firmed the higher their probability is (Earman and Salmon, 1992, pp. 89-92).
In opposition to Lakatosianism, Bayesianism specifies a number of different
features of confirmation which may contrast with one another. It could well be the
case that a hypothesis is superior to an alternative as regards prior probability but
lags behind with respect to the specification of relevant evidence. Yet Bayes' theo-
rem outlines a mathematical procedure for balancing the various features involved.
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Let me assume for the sake of argument that the challenge of weighting divergent
requirements unambiguously, as highlighted by Kuhn, can be met within the Bayesian
framework. What is more worrying is the second one of Kuhn's challenges, namely,
to render precise the criteria used for rating hypotheses. Any Bayesian hypothesis
appraisal requires the evaluation of all the quantities contained in Bayes' theorem. But
real-life examples presented by Bayesians themselves (Howson and Urbach, 1989,
pp. 96-102) make it conspicuous that assigning quantitative measures to the Bayesian
magnitudes is a highly arbitrary affair. It is far from obvious, for instance, what is a
fair estimate of the prior probability of the heliocentric hypothesis around 1550. And
it is quite tricky to assess the expectedness of phenomena like retrograde planetary
motion in the Copernican scheme as compared to the Ptolemaic one. A large amount
of deliberate fine-tuning is requisite until a rank-order of hypothesis probabilities is
finally produced. The suspicion is that different estimates can be given within the
bounds of plausibility which would reverse the Order of hypothesis probabilities
(Worrall, 1993, pp. 333-342).
As a result, Kuhn-underdetennination is here to stay. Actually, this feature is some-
times advanced as a virtue rather than a vice of Bayesianism. For instance, Wesley
Salmon argues that the prior probability in Bayes' theorem designates the plausibility of
the hypothesis against the relevant background knowledge. Such estimates of plausibil-
ity are clearly liable to subjective variation. It follows that the evaluation of quantities in
Bayes' theorem leaves room for individual choice. The application of the same formula
to the same methodological challenge may thus yield divergent methodological assess-
ments. This helps to avoid the risk of premature unanimity, as described by Kuhn. It is at
this juncture where Tom Kuhn meets Tom Bayes (Salmon, 1990, pp. 180-182).
To sum up, it seemed at ferst sight that the limitations in methodological judgment
that underlie Kuhn-underdetermination originated from the haphazard character of
Kuhn's list of criteria. Accordingly, it appeared promising to overcome these limita-
tions by appealing to systematic methodological theories. 1 concentrated an two such
theories. Lakatos focuses an confirmed predictions of novel facts, Bayesianism places
hypothesis probability at center stage. These theories were supposed to direct meth-
odological judgment or at least to explain with hindsight why a particular scientific
theory was adopted under the conditions at hand. However, an closer scrutiny both
methodological theories founder in this task of accounting for theory choice decisions.
The criteria of excellence they specify are liable to uncertainties of the same kind as
Kuhn's accidental collection they were supposed to replace. Lakatos' methodology
suffers from the uncertainties involved in delineating the scope of research programs,
and Bayesianism comes to grief because of the arbitrariness of imputing numerical values
to all conditional probabilities needed in order to arrive at hypothesis probabilities.
At a second glance, however, this null result makes sense. Kuhn's argument as to
premature unanimity provides an epistemic reason why appropriate methodologies
ought to fail in rank-ordering hypotheses er theories unambiguously. This suggests
that methodologies should abstain from the attempt to guide theory choice stringently.
Accounting for theory choice might have been the wrong job description for
methodologies in the ferst place. Let's examine, therefore, whether methodologies
prove helpful in another respect.
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3. HIGHLIGHTING FEATURES OF EXCELLENCE
An alternative picture is that methodological theories highlight features that are relevant
to the excellence of a scientific theory. They indicate what a scientific theory worth
being accepted should be like and which credentials rightly count in its favor. Con-
versely, methodological theories specify which factors have no impact an the quality
assessment of a scientific hypothesis. The particular asset of methodological theories
is that they serve to connect and unify such features of excellence. Kuhn's collection
is assembled ad hoc. One might easily add further criteria or delete others. By contrast,
a methodological theory identifies such features from a unified point of view. It gives
a systematic and coherent account of methodological distinction and thus provides
a rationale as to why these features and not others are to be preferred. Yet when it
comes to drawing an such criteria for selecting the most appropriate hypothesis or
theory under particular circumstances, no algorithm or straightforward procedure can
be articulated. Methodological theories fail to remove Kuhn-underdetermination, but
they can contribute to designating the space left to individual judgment and choice
more systematically and more thoroughly.
Let me begin with the bearing of anomalies an the appraisal of theories. Popper
famously required that all empirical difficulties be taken seriously. Scientific method
demands not glossing over anomalies but dealing with them and treating them as
potential counterexamples. Kuhn, by contrast, advances an immunity claim of para-
digms to anomalies as a historical generalization, and he adds the epistemic rationale
that anomalies are ubiquitous in science so that the advice to accept each of them as
a potential refutation would be tantamount to closing down the business of theory
construction (Kuhn, 1970a, pp. 79-82). Here is what follows an this issue from Lakatos'
methodology. A program or a program version is backed by correctly anticipated
empirical regularities. Assume a contender challenges the theory at hand. Successfully
predicted facts have not been accounted for by the contender; otherwise, they would
not have been novel in the first place. Consequently, the methodology implies that
only those facts are suitable for buttressing a program which cannot be explained by
its rival. Reversing the point of view, it follows that only those facts militate against
a program that favor its competitor. This entails that only those anomalies count as a
failure which can be solved by the rival in an acceptable fashion, i.e., by predicting
some novel property of the phenomenon or some hitherto unknown phenomenon. In
sum, no refutation without confirmation. Accordingly, the mere inability to accom-
modate this or that observational regularity does not bring a program into trouble
(Lakatos, 1970, pp. 37, 92).
On the whole, then, Kuhn's innnunity claim can be derived from Lakatos' require-
ments for empirical support. Research programs are rightly immune to mere anomalies.
If a research program is to be criticized effectively it is not sufficient to expound its
liabilities. Rather, what hurts a program is the methodologically distinguished solution
to its problems within a different theoretical perspective.
Another historical regularity stressed by Kuhn is that paradigms are never given
up unless an appropriate alternative is available. Scientific revolutions always involve
theory-substitutions. Its Lakatosian analog is: No program abandonment without
program replacement. A program is only discredited methodologically if a superior
competitor is waiting in the wings. This condition can be derived from a corollary to
the imtmutity argument. This argument Said that the liabilities of one theory are the
assets of the other. There are no significant failures without an alternative solution. And
obviously enough, if a theory is not in trouble it should not be given up. lt follows that
a program can never be rated as deficient unless there is a contender attacking it with
some success. Disconfirmation of a program is produced by a corroborated rival.b
Kuhn's claims as to paradigm immunity and paradigm substitution are leveled as
factual objections to methodological requirements entertained by Popper. They are
advanced as historical counterexamples to Popper's demands. Within the framework
of Lakatos' methodology, by contrast, the two features of immunity and substitution
constitute theorems rather than objections. Lakatos' conception thus provides a meth-
odological explanation for these Kuhnian characteristics of scientific change (Carrier,
2002, pp. 64-66).
The positive scheme Lakatos devises places emphasis an the planned growth of
knowledge as a chief distinction of an acceptable research program. 1 mentioned that
the central empirical hallmark suggested by Lakatos is the confirmed prediction of
novel facts. This brings patterns of theory change to the focus of methodological
assessment. Mature science contains coherent, large-scale research programs, unified
by a set of principles and directives; superior programs do not respond to the data but
anticipate them. This suggests that Lakatos' methodology outlines desirable features
of a theory. The methodology says in a systematic and well-articulated fashion what
a good theory should be like and which credentials can be rightly cited in its favor.
It is true, methodologies thereby automatically contribute to explaining certain patterns
of theory choice. If a theory is accepted by the scientific community which excels in
these respects, the methodology serves as an explanation of this choice. In view of the
argument in Sect. 2, however, it has to be granted that there will always be a number of
opaque and messy cases in which the actual choice is underdetermined by the criteria
suggested by the methodology. This is why the specification of the attractive features
of a theory falls short of accounting for theory-choice decisions comprehensively.
The Same lesson emerges with respect to Bayesianism. In order to realize the
relevant features more distinctively, Bayes' theorem needs to be developed mathe-
matically. If the denominator is expanded using the theorem of total probability, the
so-called second form of Bayes' theorem is obtained which was first enunciated by
Pierre Simon de Laplace (Howson and Urbach, 1989, pp. 26-27, 86-87).
p(e/h)p(h)P(uie)= p(e/h) p(h) + p(e/-h) p(-h)
6 Lakatos (1970, p. 35, 1971, pp. 112-113). It follows that any serious test of a theory demands a com-
parison between theories. This important consequence of Lakatos' methodological approach completely
escaped Kuhn's notice. Kuhn mistakenly objected that in Lakatos, as in Popper, the existente of a
theoretical alternative was merely accidental (Kuhn, 1980, p. 191). In fact, Lakatos' notion of empirical
support is crafted such that only a successful competitor can bring a theory into trouble.
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"-h" or "not h" means that the hypothesis is wrong; p(e/h) and p(e/-h) express the
degree to which the data e can be expected to occur if the hypothesis was true or
false, respectively. Rearranging the terms an the right-hand side yields:
1
p(h/e) = l+ p(e/-h) p(-h)
p(elh) p(h)
This form of Bayes' theorem makes it conspicuous that the hypothesis probability or
degree of confirmation depends an two ratios. First, the ratio of the likelihood of the
evidence given the falsity or the truth of the hypothesis, respectively: p(e/ h): p(e/h).
This ratio expresses to which degree one could anticipate the occurrence of the data e by
relying an h or, altematively, by drawing an the background knowledge alone. The
resulting hypothesis probability is high if this ratio is small, that is, if the likelihood
of the data is small if h is false but large if h is true. Second, the ratio of the Prior
probability of the hypothesis to its negation: p(-h): p(h). The more plausible h was
before any relevant data turned up (and, correspondingly, the less probable - h was),
the better h is confirmed ceteris paribus.
1 focus an the influence of the likelihood, that is, the expectedness of the data.
The crucial feature is that data which are not to be expected given the background
knowledge alone, but are suggested if a hypothesis is accepted in addition, have a
particularly strong confirmatory impact. It is the increase in the expectedness of the
data through the adoption of the hypothesis that makes this hypothesis probable. Let
me give two examples of this feature.
The increase in likelihood is the methodological procedure Bayesianism employs
for granting excellence to theories which account for otherwise mysterious phenomena.
Such phenomena are surprising given nothing but the pertinent background knowl-
edge. That is, the likelihood of the relevant data is very low. Let some hypothesis be
adopted that explains these data (if conjoined to the background knowledge). Given this
amended knowledge, the effect was to be expected. The likelihood of the evidence is
raised by accepting the hypothesis, so that the probability of the hypothesis is thereby
increased.
The same procedure also covers the methodological distinction of confirmed pre-
dictions of novel facts. The adoption of a hypothesis which anticipates new observa-
tional regularities obviously heightens the expectedness of these regularities. From a
Bayesian point of view, it is immaterial for this increase in likelihood whether or not
the evidence was known before the hypothesis was formulated. The occurrence of the
fall cycle of the phases of Venus was certainly not to be expected in the Ptolemaic
approach, but it could have been anticipated an a Copernican basis. Galileo's observa-
tion thus supports Copernicanism an both Lakatosian and Bayesian grounds although
the mechanism of support is different in each case. In Lakatos, temporal novelty plays
a key rote, in Bayesianism the increase in the expectedness of data, possibly well
known before, is the critical quantity.
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The Same feature of likelihood increase also underlies the Bayesian appreciation
of theories that contribute to unifying otherwise diverse phenomena. The basis for
this methodological premium awarded to theoretical unification is a characteristic of
probability theory according to which the joint occurrence of independent events is
less probable than their individual occurrence. The basis is the multiplication theorem
of probability: p(a n b) = p(a) p(b). If theie is no connection among phenomena, the
likelihood of their combined appearance, p(a n b), is lower than that of their separate
appearance, p(a) or p(b), respectively. By contrast, if a theory reveals that these phe-
nomena are related to one another, theirjoint occurrence is anticipated. They were not
independent events in the ferst place but are rather produced by the same process. As
a result, the likelihood of the entire dass of phenomena is raised, and this significant
increase strongly confirms the underlying unifying hypothesis.
Actually, this type of explanatory achievement was claimed by Copernicus and the
early Copernicans as the major advantage of heliocentrism (Carrier, 2001, pp. 134-
136). 1 mentioned before that the heliocentric account of retrogression nahlrally estab-
lished the observed correlations between the relevant aspects of the phenomenon, and
that the Ptolemaic approach had to adjust these correlations by hand (see Sect. 1). For
instance, it follows immediately from the heliocentric order of the planets that if the
earth overtakes a superior planet, retrograde motion occurs, the sun is located opposite
to the planet, and the planet is closest to the earth and thus appears most brightly. In
the Ptolemaic framework, such connections among the phenomena are taken care of
by specific, tailor-made adaptations. There was no reason to expect these correlations
prior to their actual observation. Analogously, it follows from the Same principle of the
heliocentric order of the planets that Mercury and Venus always remain in the vicinity
of the sun - their elongation is bounded - whereas the angular distance of the other
planets is unlimited. This distinction among the planets can be reproduced an a Ptole-
maic basis, to be sure, but only by adding specific assumptions. Copemicans gave a
unified explanation of this set of apparently diverse phenomena. They thus increased
the likelihood of these phenomena and thereby conferred a high degree of credibility
to the unifying hypothesis.
4. CONCLUSION
In this essay 1 have approached the issue of the appropriate role of methodology from
a basically empirical perspective by exploring the bearing of diverse methodologies
an theory-choice in science (Carrier, 1986, pp. 210-220; Nola and Sankey, 2000,
pp. 22-26). The result is, first, that methodological theories are not particularly good
at giving concrete advice in such matters. The strength of methodological theories
does not lie in singling out the best scientific theory unambiguously or in attributing
precise degrees of confirmation. lt requires art of judgment to bring general consid-
erations to bear an particular, intricate cases. Attempts to reach a comparative assess-
ment of rival theories by straightforward derivation from methodological principles
are thwarted, as a rule, by the complexity of the Situation. Meanderings in the pro-
gram structure often prohibit the unambiguous assessment of methodological assets
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and liabilities; the multiplicity of alternative criteria and their lack of precision makes
a clear, rule-governed verdict hard to reach. Methodology falls short of providing an
evaluation algorithm; Kuhn underdetermination will continue to haunt methodological
assessment.
However, second, methodological theories still play an important role. Their
strength becomes conspicuous once we compare methodologies such as Lakato-
sianism and Bayesianism with Kuhn's list of explanatory virtues. Kuhn's Big Five
constitute an accidental collection of methodological values that might be expanded
or abridged according to day-to-day needs. They are not tied together by a unify-
ing principle. In contradistinction, methodological theories specify a coherent set
of explanatory virtues. They systematically determine which features contribute to
epistemic merit.
For instance, Lakatosianism takes theory change as the key element for judging
epistemic achievement (see Sect. 3). This general commitment ramifies into empha-
sizing the guidance of theory development by heuristic directives and the successful
prediction of formerly unknown phenomena. Analogously, Bayesianism is led by its
commitment to Bayes' theorem to stress virtues to the effect that a good hypothesis
should be plausible in light of the background knowledge and show that the data could
have been expected beforehand. Methodological theories nerve to endow a set of such
features of excellence with a unifying perspective that makes it clear why precisely
this set is an appropriate indication of epistemic achievement.'
In his famous study an the The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory Duhem
considers it the chief objective of physics to order and classify empirical generaliza-
tions. The aim and structure of methodological theory comes out not completely dis-
similar. Its principal tack is to give a systematic and unifying account of the diverse
rules, maxims, virtues, and criteria that might be considered relevant to judging
the epistemic achievement of a theory. The Basis of this understanding is Duhem's
insight, as mentioned before (see Sect. 1), that non-empirical virtues are inevitably
to be drawn upon, in addition to logic and experience, in order to assess the cred-
ibility of claims in science. But Duhem advances only the bon sens of the scientists
as a yardstick. Kuhn goes further in this respect in making the relevant virtues more
explicit, but the collection of epistemic values he suggests remain unsystematic and
lack a unifying perspective. It is the challenge of methodological theories to do
better and to achieve for criteria of judgment what scientific theories, following
Duhem, accomplish for empirical generalizations: establishing a systematic order
and classification.
The meta-methodological principle underlying this approach to evaluating methodological theories
is "reflective equilibrium." This principle directs us to bring intuitions about particular instances into
harmony with intuitions about general mies. Transferred to the reahn of methodology, the task is to
preserve a maximum of normative intuitions about particular scientific achievements and about general
cognitive goals of science (Kola and Sankey, 2000, p. 25). It is in virtue of this principle that the inability
to justify concrete instances oftheory choice in an unambiguous way, as elaborated in this essay , creates
a tension which is attempted tobe resolved by a changed assessment of the proper role ofmethodologies.
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METHOD AND OBJECTIVITY
Commentmy an "The Aim Structure of Methodological Theory ", by Martin Carrier
MICHEL BITBOL
Conceptions of scientific theories are usually distributed into two distinct subsets. The
first one is normative and teleological. According to it, scientific theories have or
should have "epistemic value"; they have or should have credentials for approach-
ing isomorphism with a putative "external reality" construed as a final target and a
criterion of truth; and therefore the ultimate structure of theories is necessary. The
second one has an evolutionist tinge; it restricts its normative aspect to viability. Here,
no epistemic value is required, but only adaptative value; no truth, but empirical ade-
quacy; no pre-defined final target, but a proteiform quest for ecological niches; no
necessity of correspondence, but historical contingency. A third conception, a "middle
way", can however be identified in the history of ideas. This alternative conception
(called transcendental epistemology) was ferst formulated in a highly fixist version
by Kant, and later made more flexible and historically sensitive by the neo-kantian
lineage. In this third conception, epistemic value is retained, yet only as a regula-
tive ideal. The claim of truth is no longer discarded but it is thoroughly redefined.
Truth is not restricted to logical coherence, nor does it imply mere correspondence
with "things-in-themselves". Rather, "objective truth" means "connection according
to laws of experience' provided in advance by our understanding; namely connection
of phenomena according to those very "constitutive laws" whose application are a
condition of possibility of any experience of objects. Moreover, in Cassirer's version
of neo-kantianism, the constitutive laws are historically drifting, by way of a progres-
sive conquest of accurate "symbolic forms"; but the content of scientific theories is
still ascribed a certain amount of internal necessity in so far as it must incorporate the
group-structure whose invariants define its own objects (Cassirer, 2004).
The method of theory choice is then seen in a very different light according to the
status one ascribes to scientific theories. Each one of the three former views of theories
is naturally associated with a certain approach to methodology. If what is retained
from scientific theories is only their adaptative value, methodology is bound to remain
extremely flexible and pragmatic. Among the manifold theories that are either merely
I. Kant, P, olegomena to any Future Metaphvsics, Sect. 49.
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